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Thoughts from Across the Water on 
Hearsay and Confrontation 
By Richard D. Friedman 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
Summary: This article draws on the history of the hearsay rule, and on recent decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights, to argue that the right to confrontation 
should be recognised as a basic principle of the law of evidence, and that aspects of the 
Law Commission's proposals for reform of the hearsay rule, and of the Home Office's 
proposals for restrictions on the right of cross-examination, are therefore unsat­
isfactory. 
To an American scholar, it is reassuring to know that the English are as displeased 
with their law of hearsay as we are with ours. On both sides of the Atlantic, the law 
excludes highly probative evidence and causes unnecessary inconvenience and 
expense, and it is extraordinarily complex and often irrational. 1 As the Law 
Commission has properly recognised-and as the drafters of our evidentiary rules 
have not-it is desperately in need of reform. 
At the same time, lurking within the rule against hearsay, and often shrouded by 
its many excesses and oddities, is a principle of magnificent importance, a principle 
first enunciated long before the development of the common law system but one 
that achieved full development within that system. This is the principle that a person 
may not offer testimony against a criminal defendant unless it is given under oath, face to 
face with the accused and subject to cross-examination. It is this principle-and not 
concerns about the reliability of hearsay evidence or the supposed inability of the 
jury to deal with the weaknesses of evidence-that should drive the law concerning 
secondary evidence. 
This underlying principle is articulated-though sufficiently cryptically that our 
Supreme Court has not recognised it2-in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that "(i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him." I shall therefore refer to the principle as the confrontation 
1 For the English side, see, e.g. Law Commission Report No. 245, Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (1997). Reasons for the "blight" are lucidly explored by 
Colin Tapper in "Hearsay in Criminal Cases: An Overview of Law Commission Report No 
245" [1997] Crim.LR. 771. For the American side, see, e.g. the papers from the Minnesota 
Hearsay Reform Conference, (1992) 76 Minn.L.Rev. 363. 
2 The Supreme Court has treated the Confrontation Clause, so far as it relates to out­
of-court statements, very nearly as if it were a constitutionalisation of the provisions on hearsay 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g. White v. Illinois, (1992) 502 U.S. 346. I have 
commented at length on this tendency in "Confrontation: The Search for First Principles" 
(1998) 86 Georgetown L.J. 1011 (hereinafter "First Principles"). 
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principle. I use the term with some hesitance, however; although I believe the 
principle should be implemented in full, it can be implemented in parts, and the 
right to be brought face to face with the adverse witnesses is not necessarily the most 
important part. One could say, for example-and recent decisions under the 
European Convention on Human Rights indicate3-that in limited situations the 
defendant may have the right to examine a witness through counsel but not the right 
to have the witness testify in his presence. 
That we in the United States should cling more tenaciously than do the English 
to an institution that we inherited from England is not altogether surprising; the 
same is true of the civil jury, and I have no doubt that we will still be dividing the 
number of ounces by 16 and the number of inches by 12 long after England has 
sensibly gone fully metric. What is very ironic, .however, is that the confrontation 
principle, which for centuries English writers proclaimed as one of the chief aspects 
of the superiority of the English adjudicative system over its Continental counter­
parts, should now be pressed on the United Kingdom from the Continent. I submit 
that developments under the European Convention, while not going quite as far as 
might be wished, suggest a framework that could help us climb out of the 
morass-careful protection of the confrontation right with respect to testimonial 
statements, including such statements made out of court, without depending on the 
rubric of hearsay law. 
In this article, I will first argue that, so far as concern about the probative value 
of the evidence is concerned, hearsay doctrine is misguided: if live testimony of the 
declarant would advance the truth-determination process, then in most cases so too 
would the declarant's hearsay statement. Thus, I contend, discourse about hearsay 
has been conducted largely along unhelpful lines. I then sketch out the confronta­
tion principle and its history, showing how its application to out-of-court statements 
is one of the fundamental pillars of our system of adjudication. Finally, I show how 
the principle accounts for some basic aspects of hearsay law that might otherwise 
appear anomalous; how it points to other aspects of hearsay law that are genuinely 
anomalous and ought to be eliminated; and how it suggests that in some respects 
proposals in the Law Commission's Report No. 245, Hearsay and Related Topics, as 
well as in the Home Office's report on the treatment of vulnerable or intimidated 
witnesses, would be moves in the wrong direction. 
If the approach suggested here were adopted, the result would be a doctrine of 
considerably narrower scope than the current law of hearsay, but one not under­
mined by a baffling and incongruous set of exceptions. The doctrine would not 
eliminate all difficult questions of application-there will always be close cases-but 
it would be based on a broad principle that can be rather easily understood and that 
would command broad respect. 
Hearsay as beneficial to truth-determination 
The Law Commission Report, like most modern discourse about hearsay, is 
pervaded by concern about truth-determination. Thus, the Report stresses the 
factors that, at least since the time of Wigmore, have often been regarded as the 
principal criteria for determining the admissibility of hearsay-reliability and, to a 
lesser extent, necessity. 
3 See the discussion of Doorson and Uzn Meche/en below in n.38. 
© SWEET & MAxWELL 
Crhn.L.R. Thoughts from Across the Water 699 
I will argue here that, to the extent that determination of truth is the goal, hearsay 
should generally be admissible if the live testimony of the declarant to the same 
proposition would be. The argument comes in several pieces. First, courts and rule 
makers cannot satisfactorily sort out categories defining reliable evidence. Secondly, 
evidence that is not particularly reliable will nevertheless assist the truth-determina­
tion process so long as it is more probative than prejudicial. Thirdly, if live testimony 
of the declarant as to a given proposition would be more probative than prejudicial, 
then ordinarily so too will be the hearsay declaration, the supposed disabilities of the 
jury notwithstanding. Fourthly, necessity as such adds little to the criterion; there is 
need for good evidence and no need for bad evidence. The most persuasive way of 
viewing the necessity criterion is perhaps as the inverse of a "best evidence" 
criterion-when better evidence than the hearsay, the live testimony of the 
declarant, is available, the need for the hearsay diminishes. But, so long as the 
proponent is not in a substantially better position than is the opponent to produce 
the declarant as a live witness, this rationale does not create a strong rationale for 
excluding hearsay. 
This discussion suggests that, to the extent the concern is the determination of 
truth, courts and rule makers should generally be receptive to hearsay, even more 
than the Law Commission Report suggests. And a corollary is that, to the extent 
hearsay should be excluded, the ground must usually be some reason other than 
that exclusion will assist the determination of truth. 
Categorisation difficulties 
How reliable a statement is depends on all the circumstances of the case. 
Accordingly, attempts to sort out prescribed categories of reliable evidence are 
doomed to failure. Consider the exception for spontaneous exclamations in 
response to a startling event. The Commission has confidence that this exception 
can be limited narrowly to cases in which there is a negligible chance of concoction 
or distortion. 4 But even if so-not so easy a matter, I think-this possibility of 
insincere statement is only one possible source of inaccuracy. The possibility of 
misperception may be considerably more significant in this context, and past a point 
the stress of excitement tends to undermine rather than enhance perceptive 
ability. 5 
Inevitably, rule makers feel pressed to allow trial courts discretionary power to 
admit hearsay that does not fit within any previously defined exception. That is the 
course that the Federal Rules of Evidence have taken,6 and now the Law 
Commission expressly recommends following their lead. 7 The Commission 
expresses the intent that this be "a very limited discretion"8-a rather ironic 
development, given that the Senate Committee that shaped the Federal Rules' 
4 paras 8.115-8.120. cf. David Ormerod, "Redundant Res Gestae?" [1998] Crim.LR. 301, 
which reflects, in my view, an appropriate disdain for the res gestae exceptions and an 
unwarranted confidence in the other exceptions, including the "safety valve" exception, that 
the Law Commission would create or preserve. 
5 See, e.g. Andrew Ashworth and Rosemary Pattenden, "Reliability, Hearsay Evidence and 
the English Criminal Trial" (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 292 at 330. 
6 See Fed. R. Evid. 807, a recent creation substantially identical to the prior Rules 803(24) 
and 804(b)(5). 
7 paras 6.48-6.53. 
8 para. 6.49 (emphasis in original). 
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residual exception strongly expressed a similar intention, 9 and that the courts have 
run roughshod over it. '0 The analysis presented here will, I hope, support the view 
that, to the extent the concern is truth determination, a "safety valve" exception of 
this sort is inadequately receptive to hearsay, and to the extent that a fundamental 
right is at stake such an exception tends to undermine it. 
Unreliable evidence as an aid to determination of truth 
Evidence need not be particularly reliable to aid the search for truth. Suppose that 
testifying to proposition X would be in a witness's self-interest and that the witness 
in fact testifies to X. Suppose further we make an assessment that the witness would 
be essentially certain to testify to X if it is true but that if X were false the probability 
would still be 50 per cent that the witness would testify to it. In these circumstances, 
the evidence is hardly reliable, and yet-assuming for the moment that the jury does 
not overvalue it-it clearly helps in truth-determination, much like evidence that the 
defendant has the same common blood type as a stain left by the perpetrator at the 
crime scene. Indeed, a rational factfinder would conclude that the testimony 
doubles the prior odds of X. 11 
One piece of unreliable evidence presumably will be unpersuasive to the jury and 
insufficient to support a verdict. But sufficiency is determined on the basis of the 
entirety of the evidence; an accumulation of unreliable evidence may be very 
persuasive. In determining admissibility of a single item of evidence, if the aim is to 
advance the search for truth, the basic question is not an aggregate but a marginal 
one, whether the aggregate of evidence is better with or without that item 
included---or, put another way, whether that item is more probative than preju­
dicial. 
It is helpful to bear in mind in this context that the paradigm of acceptable 
evidence, live testimony of a witness subject to cross-examination, need not be 
particularly reliable to assist in truth-determination. And yet courts do not generally 
purport to determine the reliability of testimony as a prerequisite for admitting it. 
Indeed, whenever there is a conflict of testimony, it is clear that the testimony of at 
least one of the witnesses-and perhaps that of both-is not only unreliable but 
false. But both are ordinarily admitted without question. 
The jury's consideration of hearsay 
It has become commonplace to assume that the jury's presumed inability to 
account sufficiently for the defects of hearsay is a primary reason for the exclu­
sionary rule-and, correspondingly, that the general absence of the jury from 
9 Sen. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), at 20, reprinted in Am.Jur.2d, New 
Topic Service: Federal Rules of Evidence (1975): "It is intended that the residual exceptions will 
be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." 
10 See, e.g. Myrna Raeder, "The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red 
Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured" (1994) 25 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 925 at 
933. 
11 This is a simple application of Bayes' Theorem, which provides that the posterior odds of 
a proposition equal the prior odds times the likelihood ratio. The prior odds are assessed 
without considering the evidence in question, and the posterior odds take that evidence into 
account. The numerator of the likelihood ratio is the probability that the evidence in question 
would arise if the proposition were true, and the denominator is the probability that the 
evidence would arise if that proposition were false. 
© SWEET & MAxWELL 
Crim.L.R. Thoughts from Across the Water 701 
English civil litigation accounts for the abolition of the rule in civil cases. 12 For 
several reasons, I believe the explanation is unconvincing. 
First, this defective-jury explanation for the hearsay rule seems to have become 
prominent only in the nineteenth century,13 well after the rule had begun to emerge, 
and long after the confrontation principle on which I will focus had become 
established. 
Secondly, empirical evidence supporting the defective-jury explanation is alto­
gether lacking. Such empirical evidence as there is suggests that jurors do not fail to 
discount hearsay evidence to take its weaknesses into account. 14 Indeed, there is 
some suggestion that in some circumstances jurors may tend to discount hearsay too 
much rather than too little.15 
Thirdly, it must always be borne in mind that hearsay can be highly probative 
evidence. To conclude that truth-determination will be advanced rather than 
hindered by exclusion of an item of hearsay requires more than merely that the 
jurors will overvalue the hearsay. It requires that they will overvalue it by so much 
that they are led further away from the truth than if they had never heard it-that 
in some sense they will give the evidence more than twice the weight it should have. 
That is a very high degree of overvaluation. Assuming that live testimony of the 
declarant as to a given proposition would be more probative than prejudicial, 16 then 
usually the declarant's hearsay statement asserting that proposition will be as 
well. 
Necessity and the "best evidence" rationale 
The Law Commission also points to necessity as a crucial criterion in determin­
ing the admissibility of hearsay. 1 7 But how much does this factor add to the analysis? 
There is need for good evidence and no need for bad evidence. If a material 
proposition is in dispute and an item of evidence bearing on that proposition is more 
probative than prejudicial, there is need for the evidence; if it is more prejudicial 
than probative, there is no need for it, and the fact that the declarant is unavailable 
should not render it admissible. 
Perhaps that analysis is too glib, though not by very much. I think the necessity 
criterion fails because it operates from the premise that most hearsay is not of net 
assistance to truth determination. The analysis above suggests that the premise 
12 See, e.g. Tapper, supra, at 777. 
13 See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence 
(1942), at 36, and "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept" (1948) 62 
Harv. L. Rev. 177, 182-83. A famous, and perhaps seminal, expression of the jury-defect view 
was that of Mansfield, C.J., in Re Berkeley, 4 Camp. 401, 415, 171 E.R. 128, 135 (H.L. 1811). 
He said that the different attitudes towards hearsay in Scotland and in England "seem to me 
to have a reasonable foundation in the different manner in which justice is administered in the 
two countries." In Scotland, as in most of the Continent, judges were the finders of fact, and 
they could "trust themselves entirely" to give hearsay such little weight as it seemed to them 
to deserve. "But in England, where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay is properly 
excluded, because no man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds." 
14 See, e.g. Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park and Steven D. Penrod, "Jurors' 
Perceptions of Eyewimesses and Hearsay Evidence" (l 992) 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703. 
15 See Peter Miene, Roger C. Park and Eugene Borgida, "Juror Decision Making and the 
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence" (l 992) 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683. 
16 This may be in doubt, for example, if the proposition has dubious relevance to the case 
but potential inflammatory impact. 
17 e.g. para. 6.l. 
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should be reversed. And then the inverse of a necessity argument comes more 
sharply into view. The point is not that in some cases hearsay should be admitted 
because the unavailability of the declarant renders the hearsay necessary. Rather, it 
is that in some cases, even though the hearsay would be net beneficial to the truth­
determination process, the availability of the declarant means that exclusion may 
advance the truth-determination process by inducing proponents to produce better 
evidence-the testimony of the declarant, taken subject to oath and cross­
examination.18 
Although the Law Commission expressly disclaimed reliance on a "best evi­
dence" rationale, 19 I submit that this is the best justification for taking a sharply
more receptive attitude towards hearsay when the declarant is unavailable. 20 But, 
even where the declarant is readily available, this rationale does not justify a broad 
exclusion of hearsay. Assuming the evidence is more probative than prejudicial, and 
that the proponent is not (and was not) substantially better able than the opponent 
to produce the declarant, there is a ready response to the opponent who argues that 
the live testimony of the declarant would be better evidence than the hearsay: 
"Produce her yourself." The evidence that the proponent has chosen to lead is, by 
hypothesis, more beneficial than detrimental to truth-determination; if the oppo­
nent hopes to do better by the presentation of other evidence, including the live 
testimony of the declarant, then it is her choice to do so. Granted, doing so does not 
put the opponent in as favourable a position as he would have if the proponent 
presented the declarant as a wimess and the opponent then cross-examined. But if 
this is a problem (I am unsure whether it is), the best solution is an adjustment of 
procedure rather than outright exclusion of probative evidence. 21 
Summary 
If truth-determination is all that is at stake, the elimination of hearsay in civil 
cases and the proposals of the Law Commission for criminal cases are steps in the 
right direction, though perhaps complete abrogation went somewhat too far in that 
direction and the Law Commission does not go quite far enough. 22 If the live
testimony of the declarant would assist truth determination, then usually so too will 
the hearsay statement. The "best evidence" rationale might support exclusion of 
hearsay in some circumstances, but at least for the most part only if the proponent 
18 In some cases, the hearsay may appear to be better evidence than testimony, because the 
hearsay reflects a fresher memory. But the testimony can, if appropriate, be supplemented by 
the hearsay; testimony under oath and cross-examination supplemented by the prior statement 
is bound to be better evidence than the prior statement alone. 
19 paras 6.17-6.32. 
20 Thus, the Law Commission recommends a broad hearsay exception for statements made
by declarants unavailable at trial. Arguably, though, a predicate for the exception should be 
that the proponent did not have adequate opportunity to take the wimess's deposition before 
trial. Note that failure of the proponent to take such an opportunity may, in some 
circumstances, preclude a finding of unavailability under Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(a)(5). 
21 I have proposed a procedural solution: If the opponent secures the presence of the 
declarant, willing and able to testify, by a prescribed time, then the proponent is obligated to 
present her live testimony of forgo the use of the hearsay. See "Improving the Procedure for 
Resolving Hearsay Issues" (1991) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 883. I express further thoughts on the 
matter in "Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation" (1998) 49 Hastings 
L.J. (forthcoming). 
22 cf. J. R. Spencer, "Hearsay Reform: A Bridge not Far Enough?" [1996] Crim.LR. 29.
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is or was substantially better able than the opponent to produce the declarant as a 
wimess subject to oath and cross-examination. 
The Confrontation Principle 
Now shift gears. Let us consider the requirements that a legal system should 
impose on witnesses offering testimony against an accused, not merely to assist in 
truth determination but as a matter of procedural right.23 Ideally, testimony should 
be given: 
(I) under oath, or some other procedure designed to ensure that the wimess 
is at risk for false statement; 
(2) subject to cross-examination by the accused or counsel; 
(3) in the presence of the accused; and 
( 4) in the presence of the trier of fact. 
For nearly half a millennium, at least since Thomas Smith described a criminal 
trial as an "altercation" between accusing wimess and defendant, these conditions 
have described the norm under which common law trials have been held. 24 These 
conditions are hardly unique to the common law system. The oath has been 
required by many systems at least since Roman times. And the Book of Acts, 25: 16, 
quotes the Roman governor Festus as declaring: 
"It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he 
which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for 
himself concerning the crime laid against him." 
Not all legal systems, however, impose all these conditions as a matter of course. 
Indeed, Continental systems traditionally took testimony out of the presence of the 
parties, in a closed proceeding. And for hundreds of years, English commentators 
declared the superiority of the English system on this score. 25 
English adherence to these principles was by no means uncluttered, however. For 
one thing, the fourth condition-that testimony be taken before the trier of 
fact-has always been regarded as a rule of preference; if the witness is unavailable 
at trial, a pretrial deposition will suffice. Indeed, notwithstanding the English 
hostility towards Continental methods of taking testimony, by the middle of the 
seventeenth century a sophisticated body of doctrine had developed governing when 
23 I will not consider here the complex issue of the extent to which similar conditions should 
apply to other testimony-other than to say that, without the power of the state to gather and 
preserve evidence on the side of the proponent and the liberties of a criminal defendant on the 
side of the opponent, there are good reasons for being more lax. 
The historical discussion here is gleaned from research on the history of hearsay that I am 
currently doing with Dr Michael Macnair-who has no share of blame for any inaccuracies 
here. 
24 Thomas Smith, De RepublicaAnglorum, Bk. 2, ch. 15, (c. 1565; Mary Dewar, ed., 1982), 
at 114. Another condition, at least in the modem era, is that to the extent possible the witness 
should give her affirmative testimony in her own words, rather than merely affirming or 
denying a proposition put to her. See Walker Jameson Blakey, "Substantive Use of Prior 
Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence" (1975) 64 Ky L.J. 
3.42-3.43. 
25 e.g. Case of the Union of the Realms, (1604) Moore (K.B.) 790, 798, 72 E.R. 908, 913 
(Popham, L.C.J.); Sollon Emlyn, Preface to State Trials (1730); Matthew Hale, History of the 
Common Law (c. 1670; C. M. Gray, ed., 1971), at 163-164. 
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depositions taken in equity-a system following Continental models-could be 
used at trial because of the unavailability of the witness. 26 Further, examinations 
taken by a magistrate under oath could be used at trial if the witness was then 
unavailable-but this practice was barred, absent cross-examination, in 1696 for 
misdemeanour cases, 27 and by the mid-nineteenth century in felony cases. 28 Finally, 
defendants in politicised cases in England did not always have an opportunity to 
confront adverse witnesses. From the early sixteenth century, treason defendants 
frequently demanded that the witnesses be brought "face to face" with them to give 
or affirm their testimony. 29 Sometimes the demands were granted, sometimes not. 
But Parliament repeatedly supported the demands, with the "face to face" 
formula, 30 and by the middle of the seventeenth century, the principle was well 
established.31 Thence, the principle passed to America,32 eventually being 
enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Bill of Rights. 
Though the history is not as neat as one might wish, I believe it suggests that the 
first three conditions set forth above are, and for the most part have long been 
recognised to be, indispensable: testimony given without satisfying them is not 
acceptable. Thus, if a witness refuses to give satisfactory recognition of an obligation 
of truth-telling, or to testify in the presence of the accused, or to submit to cross­
examination, the testimony should be rejected. Perhaps more moderate rules should 
be adopted for child witnesses or those suffering a substantial mental disability33; I 
prefer not to express an opinion on this issue here. 34 Apart from these troublesome 
cases, I believe that only one qualification to this principle should be recognised: if 
26 e.g. Fortescue v. Coake, Godb. 193, 78 E.R. 117 (Com. Pleas, 1612); Anon., Godb. 326, 
78 E.R. 192 (K.B. 1623); Rushworth v. Countess de Pembroke & Currier, (1668) Hardres 472, 
145 E.R. 553. Note Gilbert's comment on Rushworth in his Treatise on Evidence (1760 ed.), 
at 45: "A Deposition can't be given in Evidence against any Person that was not Party to the 
Suit, and the Reason is, because he had not Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses, and 'tis 
against natural Justice that a Man should be concluded in a Cause to which he never was a 
Party." 
This law developed more rapidly and systematically in civil cases, in part because of the 
presence of counsel there and in part because of the use, discussed in the text, in criminal cases 
of examinations taken before magistrates. 
27 R. v. Paine, (1696) 1 Salk. 281, 91 E.R. 246. 
28 R. v. Forbes, (1814) Holt 599, 171 E.R. 354; Stat. 11 & 12 Viet. c. 42. s.17 (1848). 
29 Note, for example, the trial of the Duke of Buckingham in 1521, recounted by 
Shakespeare in King Henry VIII, II: 1, on the basis of contemporary sources; R. v. Rice ap 
Griffith (1531), in 1 J. H. Baker, ed., T he Reports of Sir John Spelman, 93 Publications of the 
Selden Society (1976), Corone, pl. 12, p.47, at 48; Seymour's Case, (1549) 1 How.St.Tr. 483, 
492; Duke of Somerset's Trial, (1551) 1 How.St.Tr. 515, 517, 520; Raleigh's Trial, (1603) 2 
How.St.Tr. at 15, 18, 19, 23. 
30 See, e.g. Stats. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 11, s.9; 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 10, s.11; 1 Eliz. 1, ch. 5, 
s.10; 13 Eliz. 1, ch. 1, s.9. 
31 See, e.g. Trial of John Lilburne, (1649) 4 How.St.Tr. at 1329. 
32 e.g., Massachusetts Const., pt. I, art. XII (1780), Richard L. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 
(1955), at 376 (right of accused "to meet the witnesses against him face to face"). 
33 See, e.g. Maryland v. Craig, (1990) 497 U.S. 836. 
34 Factors distinguishing these cases from that of the ordinary adult witness include: (I) the 
higher possibility of trauma of the child or disabled witness; (2) the higher probability that the 
child or disabled witness will be psychologically unable to testify under ordinary procedures, 
especially in the presence of the defendant; (3) the virtual worthlessness, in many cases, of the 
opportunity for cross-examining such witnesses; and ( 4) the lack of understanding and 
independence on the part of such a witness, making compulsion on any morally tolerable 
terms impractical. 
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the witness's unavailability or inability to give testimony under satisfactory condi­
tions is attributable to the wrongdoing of the accused, then the accused should be 
deemed to have forfeited his objection to testimony not given under those 
conditions. 35 I do not believe that this qualification should be extended to the 
situation in which the witness is afraid to testify but the fear cannot be attributed to 
wrongdoing of the accused; in light of the problems of proof that this extension 
avoids, however, the temptation to adopt it, as England has done,36 is easily enough 
understood. 
Note that in this analysis I have not referred to hearsay. And it is notable that the 
recent European cases, without suggesting anything remotely resembling the 
common law of hearsay-and with little or no attention to matters of reliability­
nevertheless recognise a fundamental right of the accused under Articles 6(1) and 
6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights to examine an adverse 
witness. 37 With only very limited exceptions, the accused must be able to exercise 
his opportunity face to face with the witness. 38 
And yet the right would be virtually nullified if the prosecutor could argue 
successfully, "Very well. The person who observed the crime has not given 
15 This old principle has been recognised in a new rule, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). I discuss 
it in "Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa" (1997) 31 Israel L. Rev. 506. 
36 See Criminai Justice Act 1988, s.23(3). 
37 See, e.g. van Mechelen v. Netherlands (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 647, 673, para. 51: 
[A]ll the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the presence of the 
accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but 
they must not infringe the rights of the defence; as a general rule, paragraphs l and 3(d) 
of Article 6 require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper opportunity to 
challenge and question a witness against him, either when he makes his statements or at 
a later stage. 
See also, e.g. Saidi v. France (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 251, 270, para. 44 (September 20, 1993) 
("The lack of any confrontation deprived him in certain respects of a fair trial."); Kostovski v. 
Netherlands (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 434, 448-49, para. 41. 
38 In Doorson v. Netherlands (l 996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330, the court held, over two dissents, that 
the Convention was not violated when wimesses in a drug case were permitted to testify 
anonymously, out of the defendant's presence. The Court based this decision on the ground 
that the wimesses might have feared the defendants; like s.23(3) of the English Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, the Court did not require that wrongdoing by the defendant be the cause of 
the fear. The Court emphasised, however, that it would have been preferable had the wimesses 
testified in the presence of the defendant, and that the procedure used by the Dutch courts in 
this case should not be used routinely. ibid. at 359. It also appears to have been crucial to the 
decision that counsel was able to question the wimesses at the appellate stage, ibid. at 359, and 
that the finding of guilt was not based "solely or to a decisive extent" on the evidence of these 
wimesses, ibid. at 360. Moreover, Doorson was, it appears, severely limited in van Meche/en v. 
Netherlands (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 64 7. There, the defendants and counsel were in a separate 
room during the examination of key wimesses, though they were able to listen to the 
examination and ask questions through a sound link. The Court held that "such extreme 
limitations on the right of the accused to have the evidence against them given in their 
presence" had not been justified, para. 60, and it distinguished Doorson on several grounds, 
including that the wimesses in van Meche/en were police officers rather than civilians and that 
their evidence had been of decisive importance. 
Perhaps a more disturbing aspect of Doorson is the portion of the majority decision declining 
to hold a violation on the basis of the use of a statement made to the police by a wimess who 
then absconded, and whom the defendant never had a chance to examine. Presumably, 
though, this decision was based on the fear consideration; it also seems to have been supported 
by the fact that the witness's statement was, at least in part, cumulative of other evidence: 22 
E.H.R.R. at 361. 
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testimony under adequate conditions. But here is a witness who will testify in court, 
under all the usual conditions, as to what that person said." To protect the 
testimonial system, then, it becomes necessary to have a narrow rule not excluding 
hearsay in general but barring secondhand evidence of testimonial statements that 
were not taken under conditions required for proper testimony. 39 
The question, of course, then becomes how to define testimonial statements for 
this purpose-a problem especially tricky given that the definition to serve its 
purpose must extend to some statements not made under the usual conditions for 
testimony. The essence, I believe, is this: a statement should be considered 
testimonial if the effect of admitting evidence of the statement would be that 
persons in circumstances similar to the declarant could knowingly create evidence 
for trial.40 Put another way, the statement is testimonial if treating it as admissible 
gives witnesses a method of testifying, whether in or out of court, formally or 
informally. Roughly speaking, the statement is testimonial if the declarant antici­
pates that it will be used in the prosecution of crime.41 
I do not pretend that determination of whether a statement is testimonial is 
always a simple matter. Usually it is reasonably straightforward, though. Some rules 
of thumb can help. For example, a statement made knowingly to the authorities 
describing criminal activity is almost always testimonial. A statement made in the 
course of going about one's ordinary business-whether legitimate or not-is not 
usually testimonial. 
That there are sometimes difficult cases-as of course there are under the current 
system and as there would be under the Law Commission's system-should not 
blind us to the great advantages of the system I am proposing. I will now discuss 
these. 
Benefits of this approach 
I have argued that: (I) most hearsay should be presumptively admissible; but that 
(2) testimonial statements, however made, should not be treated as appropriate 
evidence unless they were made under satisfactory conditions; (3) the right to cross-
39 If the witness makes the statement under unsatisfactory conditions, but then repeats it 
under satisfactory ones, I do not believe there is a problem. But if, when the witness testifies 
subject to adverse examination, she fails to reaffirm the substance of the prior substance in any 
material respect, I believe that the accused's opportunity to examine the witness is seriously 
undermined, in a way that neither the United States Supreme Court, the Strasbourg Court, 
nor the Law Commission has fully recognised. Compare my article, "Prior Statements of a 
Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket" 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 277, with California 
v. Green, (1970) 399 U.S. 149 and para. 5.21 of the Law Commission Report (discussing X 
v. FRG Appl. 8414178, (1980) 17 D & R 231). 
40 The Law Commission notes that the meaning of the word "witness" according to the 
Strasbourg Court goes beyond its usual meaning to an English lawyer, para. 5.6, but asserts 
that so far it extends only to "people who have fed information, consciously and voluntarily, 
into the criminal justice system." Para. 5.7. I think this is essentially the right approach­
except that I would delete reference to voluntariness, given that many witnesses testify under 
some form of pressure. 
41 This approach is similar in some respects to the views espoused by the Government in 
W7iite v. Illinois, (1992) 502 U.S. 346, by Justice Thomas in his separate opinion in that case, 
and by Prof. Akhil Amar in The Constitution and Criminal Procedure (1997) and in "Foreword: 
Sixth Amendment First Principles" (1995) 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 688-697. I discuss these views 
at greater length in "First Principles'', supra. 
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examine under oath or some equivalent should be regarded as indispensable, and 
probably so too should the right to have the examination taken in the defendant's 
presence; and ( 4) at least putting aside the cases of child and mentally disabled 
witnesses, these requirements should be subject only to the qualification that the 
accused forfeits any objection to a testimonial statement if his own wrongdoing 
accounts for the inability to take the testimony under satisfactory conditions. 
This system reflects what I think has always been the most important principle 
behind the hearsay rule, the principle that continues to restrain common law 
jurisdictions from doing away with the rule altogether in criminal cases, and the one 
that is behind the European cases-the principle that if someone testifies against a 
criminal defendant, the defendant has a right to have the testimony taken under 
oath, face to face and subject to cross-examination. Any yet, like the European 
cases, it reflects this principle without depending on the utterly unsatisfactory law of 
hearsay. 
Indeed, this approach helps explain some features of the current system that 
appear anomalous and provides a reasoned basis for eliminating others. Consider 
first the underlying rationale for limitations on hearsay. If all that were at stake were 
truth-determination, there would be good grounds, as Professor Tapper argues, 42 
for integration of the law of hearsay in civil and criminal cases. But the analysis here, 
like the European cases, suggests that a basic right of the accused is at stake with 
respect to some prosecution hearsay, and this factor amply justifies a sharp 
differentiation in treatment. A similar consideration accounts for the persistence of 
limitations on hearsay in criminal cases not tried by a jury4'; the European cases 
suggest that exclusion is not dependent on the nature of the trier of fact. 
Basing a limited exclusion of hearsay on the defendant's right to confront 
accusing witnesses also sheds light on another anomaly discussed by Professor 
Tapper, the existence of a "massive exception" favouring the prosecution, for 
admissions and confessions, and no comparable exception favouring the defence. 44 
The system advocated here is far more receptive than current law to hearsay 
presented by the defendant. At the same time, it easily explains the core of 
admissions doctrine: if the statement is the defendant's own, there is no adverse 
witness to confront. Moreover, the theory also explains receptivity to statements 
made in furtherance of a conspiracy, a doctrine that the Law Commission made no 
attempt to justify except as "a pragmatic one", without which it "might be hard to 
prove a conspiracy". 45 The explanation is that if a statement was made in 
furtherance of a conspiracy it was not testimonial, but merely an act in the course 
of the conspiracy's business. 
Consider also the definition of hearsay, a matter addressed at considerable length 
by the Law Commission.46 Particularly pressing, in light of R. v. Kearley,47 is the 
problem raised by Wright v. Doe d Tatham, 48 of conduct offered to prove an 
uncommunicated belief that assertedly motivated the actor. Under the current 
structure of the law-a basic structure that the Law Commission would not alter-it 
42 (1997) Crim.L.R. at 774. 
43 ibid. at 777. 
44 ibid. 
45 para. 8.131. 
46 paras 7.01-7.41. 
47 (1992) 2 A.C. 228, HL. 
48 4 Bing. (N.C.) 489, 132 E.R. 877 (H.L. 1838). 
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is critical whether or not such conduct is categorised as hearsay. But neither 
alternative is attractive. Evidence of this sort can have great probative value; hence 
the impetus to admit it. On the other hand, it seems quite odd to hold that conduct 
is more probative of a given proposition if it does not assert that proposition, a factor 
that may make the conduct far more ambiguous than most hearsay. Under the 
system presented here, little or nothing would turn on whether the conduct is 
categorised as hearsay, for there would be no presumptive exclusion of hearsay. And 
ordinarily the conduct is not testimonial in nature; not only did it not communicate 
the proposition at issue, but in virtually all cases it occurred before litigation 
appeared to the actor to be in prospect. Thus, there usually would be no reason to 
exclude the evidence. 
Indeed, more broadly, this system would eliminate the fruitless attempt to sort 
out reliable evidence from unreliable. The Law Commission's attempt to solve this 
problem with a residual exception is likely to create the same result as its American 
model: in some cases inadequacy in admitting probative evidence, in others 
violation of the accused's right to confront adverse witnesses, and throughout 
unpredictability in the exercise of discretion. 
Similarly, the Law Commission's creation of a broad exception for statements by 
declarants unavailable at trial49 is disquieting. To the extent that this exception 
would apply to non-testimonial statements, it is unnecessary under the system I am 
proposing. With respect to testimonial statements-which by definition must have 
been made in anticipation of litigation-most cases will fall into either of two 
categories. In some cases, the witness's unavailability is caused by the defendant's 
wrongdoing, and there the forfeiture principle applies. In others, the prosecution 
could have taken the witness's testimony under adequate conditions while she was 
still available, thus preserving it for trial, and the prosecution should be held to 
account for failure to do so. 50 The Law Commission's proposal provides for the case 
in which the proponent of the evidence procures the unavailability of the witness, 51 
but it gives the prosecution no incentive to preserve testimony subject to oath and 
cross-examination. Furthermore, if the prosecutor's hands are clean the proposal 
allows the Crown to use as a matter of course unsworn police station statements of 
witnesses who have since become unavailable. And it appears that, so long as a rape 
counsellor maintains independence from the prosecution, he could take an unsworn 
videotaped statement from a complainant and advise her that, if she happened to be 
unavailable at the time of trial, the video would be placed in the hands of the 
prosecution and could be admissible evidence. 
The theory advocated here also suggests that the Lord Chief Justice was correct 
in criticising a recent Home Office proposal to bar unrepresented defendants from 
personally cross-examining the complainant in cases of rape and serious sexual 
assault, and to create a general discretionary prohibition in the case of other crimes 
49 paras 8.03-8.47; draft bill, ss.3, 5. 
50 See, e.g. Forbes, supra. In the narrow case in which: (1) a witness made a testimonial 
statement favourable to the prosecution but not under proper conditions; (2) the defendant 
has not acted improperly; and (3) the prosecution did not have a reasonable opportunity to 
preserve the witness's testimony before trial under suitable conditions, I believe that the 
prosecution, the proponent of the evidence, rather than the defendant, the beneficiary of the 
confrontation right, should bear the risk that: ( 4) the witness will be unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
51 para. 8.30; draft bill, s. 9. 
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and wimesses. 52 One may well doubt the motives of a defendant who chooses to 
examine an accusing wimess personally, rather than to rely on the skill of a trained 
advocate. But personal examination-truly face-to-face-is, after all, the most 
direct as well as traditional method of confrontation. The wimess's legitimate 
interests should be guarded not by denying a longstanding right of the defendant 
but by preparing the wimess, supporting her, protecting her against violence, 
intimidation, and abusive examination, and if need be providing representation for 
her. The process may still be extremely difficult for her-as it often is even when 
examination is conducted by counsel. A necessary consequence not only of the 
confrontation right but of the very notion of a trial is that giving testimony, 
especially against a criminal defendant, is indeed a trying experience, testing, 
rigorous, and adversarial. Gratuitous trauma should be prevented, of course. But we 
cannot eliminate trauma from the process without gutting the system. 
At least these proposals by the Home Office do not appear to violate the demands 
of the European cases. The same cannot be said for the approach of the Law 
Commission. Indeed, the Law Commission appears to acknowledge some difficulty 
in reconciling its approach with those demands. 53 Rather than trying to limit the 
effectiveness of those cases, the Law Commission, in my butt-innish trans-Atlantic 
view, should have embraced them. They represent an international victory for a 
right long championed by the common law, though too often hidden in the bog of 
hearsay law. And, given the prospective incorporation of the European Convention, 
those cases indicate one more crucial advantage of the system I propose: it is legally 
valid! 
52 Home Office, Report of the Interdeparrmental Working Group on the Trearment of 
Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System, Speaking up for Justice 
Gune 1998). The comments of the Lord Chief Justice are reported in The Times, July 29, 1998, 
p. l .  
53 paras 5.13-5.20. 
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